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number of floating population of municipalities would not be required to state how long they had been residents of the state, county, and ward, but would only be required to state that they had been residents of the state, county, and ward the respective periods required by law, and would be interrogated no further, and so the whole object and purpose of the registration laws would be defeated, and the door opened to fraud and abuse of the elective franchise. So, on principle, we do not think the requirement of the statute as to stating age to be in any way an injurious, unreasonable, or unnecessary restraint, impairment, or impediment on the exercise of the elective franchise. On the contrary, we think that it is a reasonable, uniform, and impartial regulation, calculated to facilitate and secure the exercise of this right and to prevent its abuse."

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**Inns and Innkeepers—Unwarranted Disturbance of Guests' Right of Privacy.**—In *Fremen v. Page*, 131 N. E. 475, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that where an innkeeper invaded the room of guests and ordered them to leave the hotel, and assaulted, falsely imprisoned, and slandered the guests, damages might be assessed for humiliation and injury to the guests' feelings, as well as for the unwarranted disturbance of their right of privacy and exclusive use of the room, and such acts were not justified, though they arose from some mistake made by him or his agents in his records.

The court said in part: "The general law is well settled. The guest is entitled to respectful and considerate treatment at the hands of the innkeeper and his employees and servants, and this right created an implied obligation that neither the innkeeper nor his servants will abuse or insult the guest, or engage in any conduct or speech which may unreasonably subject him to physical discomfort, or distress of mind, or imperil his safety, *Lehnen v. Hines*, 88 Kan. 58, 127 Pac. 612, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 830; *De Wolf v. Ford*, 193 N. Y. 397, 86 N. E. 527, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 860, 127 Am. St. Rep. 969; *Morningstar v. Lafayette Hotel Co.*, 211 N. Y. 465, 105 N. E. 656, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 940; *McHugh v. Schlosser*, 159 Pa. 480, 28 Atl. 291, 23 L. R. A. 514, 39 Am. St. Rep. 699; 13 R. C. L. Innkeepers, § 11 and notes. And he can recover damages for injury to his feelings resulting from the humiliation to which he has been subjected. *Clancy v. Barker*, 71 Neb. 83, 98 N. W. 440, 103 N. W. 446, 69 L. R. A. (N. S.) 642, 115 Am. St. Rep. 559, 8 Ann. Cas. 682; *Aaron v. Ward*, 203 N. Y. 351, 96 N. E. 736, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 204; *Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co.*, 178 N. Y. 347, 70 N. E. 857, 66 L. R. A. 618, 102 Am. St. Rep. 503; *De Wolf v. Ford*, 193 N. Y. 397, 401, 86 N. E. 527, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 860, 127 Am. St. Rep. 969; *Head v. Georgia Pacific Railroad*, 79 Ga. 358, 7 S. E. 217, 11 Am. St. Rep.

434. The plaintiffs are not shown to have annoyed or disturbed other guests, or to have improperly demeaned themselves, or to have violated any rules of the hotel, and under suitable instructions the jury on conflicting evidence could find the defendant had been guilty of assault, false imprisonment and slander, by 'words spoken \* \* \* imputing crime.'

"It follows that the plaintiffs' four requests, that if they were unlawfully restrained of their liberty the defendant is liable in damages, and if he incited, encouraged or countenanced the presence and acts of the officer he is liable therefor, and that damages may be assessed for humiliation and injury to the plaintiff's feelings, as well as for unwarranted disturbance of his right of privacy and exclusive use of the room for himself and wife, and that even if the entry of the defendant arose from some mistake made by him or his agents 'in his records,' such mistake would not amount to a justification, were unexceptionable. The defendant's ninth request, that if the plaintiff suffered no physical injury 'she cannot recover for mental suffering,' was properly denied. As we have said, he could not treat the plaintiffs with contumely by the use of insolent language concerning them, specifically set forth in the declaration, and referred to, and characterized in the record as 'slander,' which the jury could say caused the plaintiffs not only physical annoyance and discomfort, but also worry and distress of mind. *De Wolf v. Ford*, 193 N. Y. 397, 401, 86 N. E. 527, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 860, 127 Am. St. Rep. 969. The defendant's duty in this respect is analogous to that of a common carrier of passengers. *Com. v. Power*, 7 Metc. 596, 601, 41 Am. Dec. 465; *Jackson v. Old Colony Street Railway*, 206 Mass. 477, 485, 92 N. E. 725, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1046, 19 Ann. Cas. 615; *Gorman v. Southern Pacific Co.*, 97 Cal. 1, 31 Pac. 1112, 33 Am. St. Rep. 157. In uttering incriminating words in the presence of his servants and the police officer, the defendant violated his contractual obligation to the plaintiffs as guests, of courtesy and respectful treatment, and freedom from humiliation, contempt and ridicule arising from slanderous verbal attacks.

"We are therefore of opinion that the cases come within the doctrine of *Bryant v. Rich*, 106 Mass. 180, Am. Rep. 311, and kindred decisions, and the plaintiffs can recover in contract, as fully as if they had sued in tort."

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**White Slave Traffic Act—Incidental Deviation into Another State.**  
—In *United States v. Wilson*, 266 Fed. 712, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee held that the transportation of a woman between different points in the same state is not interstate transportation, within the meaning of the White Slave Traffic Act because the route taken incidentally passes through another state.

The court said in part: "Generally speaking interstate commerce